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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OBLIGATIONS
AND RIGHTS OF CITIZENS
William N. Eskridge, Jr.*
Citizenship is a matter of unquestionable but ambiguous
constitutional significance. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
begins by announcing, "[a]l persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside."' Only after this
framing announcement does Section 1 declare the protections of the
privileges or immunities, due process, and equal protection clauses.
The few academics who focus on this first sentence maintain that it is
a source or a framing mechanism for the recognition of individual
rights.2 Professor Kenneth Karst, the leading contemporary theorist,
argues that the Fourteenth Amendment's citizenship clause, read wvith
the balance of Section 1, prohibits the state from treating members of
socially stigmatized groups as outsiders to the law or from denying
them "full inclusion in the public life of the community."'' Karst's
body of work presents an impressive case for rights of inclusion as
entailed in the citizenship clause.
The great virtues of Karst's theory are that it makes coherent sense
of a neglected constitutional provision and that its sense coheres well
with leading theories of the liberal state. I wonder, however, whether
a rights-based theory is a complete understanding of citizenship,
either at the time of the framing or even today. This article is a
* John A. Garver Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School.
1. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
2. I am using the term rights broadly, but only as mediating the relationship
between a person and the state or the community. Person A has a right if the state
(or community) is precluded from narrowing A's choices or affecting his interests in
some other way, unless there is some special justification for doing so. See, e.g.,
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 91-93, 189-91 (1977). Contrast an
obligation. Person A has an obligation if she must narrow her choices or sacrifice her
interests in some other way to serve the state (or community), unless there is some
special justification for not doing so.
3. Kenneth L. Karst, Law's Promise, Law's Expression: Visions of Power in the
Politics of Race, Gender, and Religion 193-94 (1993) (analyzing Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), an abortion case whose holding was rooted in the due
process clause); see also Kenneth L. Karst, Belonging to America: Equal Citizenship
and the Constitution 201-06, 227 (1989); Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976
Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendnent, 91 Harv. L
Rev. 1, 5-11 (1977).
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preliminary inquiry into an alternative understanding of citizenship-
one that considers obligations as well as rights, and ultimately their
interrelationship. The idea, originally suggested to me by Professors
Robert Cover and Susan Koniak, is simple enough.' Individual rights,
without more, are a thin way to express or normalize the relationship
of the individual to the community. Jewish law provides a different
focus. When the Jewish child moves into adulthood by becoming a
bar or bat mitzvah, he or she gains no greater rights than before but
instead assumes more obligations, and this assumption of
responsibility is what separates the full member of the community
from the child or the outsider. This conception provides a richer
understanding of the relationship between the individual and the
community than does liberal theory.
An understanding of citizenship that considers obligations as well as
rights can also enrich our understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment, both as it has been interpreted in the jurisprudence of
race, and as it should be interpreted in our nation's evolving
jurisprudence of sexuality, sex, and gender. The bulk of this article
will explore those doctrinal implications. I shall conclude with
reservations. In an era of expanding and diffused community, does
our nation's public law have room for a theory of citizenship that
considers obligation? Is this a pipe dream, or is it something positive
that constitutional law can contribute to our public culture?
I. A PRELIMINARY BASIS FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL CONNECTION
BETWEEN OBLIGATION AND RIGHTS
As Michael Sandel has documented in Democracy's Discontent, the
dominant American tradition of liberal rights has existed in a
dialectical relationship with a tradition of communitarian relationships
and obligations.' An exemplar of this dialectic is political philosopher
Francis Lieber's Manual of Political Ethics, published in 1838-39 and
reissued throughout the century.' Lieber devoted an entire chapter to
the "Reciprocal Relation of Right and Obligation."7 He started with
the observation that the polity where men "claim, maintain, or
establish rights" cannot be a lawful and ordered one "without
4. See Robert M. Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order,
5 J.L. & Religion 65, 68-69 (1987); Susan P. Koniak, Through the Looking Glass of
Ethics and the Wrong with Rights We Find There, 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1, 21-30
(1995).
5. Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public
Philosophy 201-49 (1996); see also Debating Democracy's Discontent: Essays on
American Politics, Law, and Public Philosophy (Anita L. Allen & Milton C. Regan,
Jr. eds., 1998) (offering various scholars' commentary on Sandel's work).
6. 1 Francis Lieber, Manual of Political Ethics 383-411 (Theodore D. Woolsey
ed., 2d ed. rev. 1911) (1838).
7. Id.
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acknowledging corresponding and parallel obligations.", He
continued:
It is natural, therefore, that wherever there exists a greater
knowledge of right, or a more intense attention to it, than to
concurrent and proportionate obligation, evil ensues.... The very
condition of right is obligation; the only reasonableness of
obligations consists in rights. Since, therefore, a greater degree of
civil liberty implies the enjoyment of more extended acknowledged
rights, man's obligations increase with man's liberty. Let us, then,
call that freedom of action which is determined and limited by the
acknowledgment of obligation, Liberty; freedom of action without
limitation by obligation, Licentiousness. The greater the liberty, the
more the duty.9
What did Lieber mean by this analysis? He clearly had two ideas in
mind, and I would read him for a third idea as well.
First, Lieber's invocation of "corresponding and parallel
obligations" that accompany rights, posits the importance of
reciprocity in the normative case for rights. Thus, someone who
comes to this country must obey our laws, but in return is also
protected by our laws.10 Call this the "reciprocity understanding" of
the relationship between rights and obligations: our rights and
obligations are parallel and roughly correlative." Second, and more
deeply, Lieber was expressing the notion that the citizen's relationship
to the state is not just one of obedience to its laws, but also involves
the exercise of civic virtue. Necessary to a free polity is the citizens'
desire to obey the law, and even to restrain themselves beyond the
law's letter. As Lieber later stated in the book, "a conscientious
citizen is not at liberty to do all that is directly permitted by law," and
is not absolved of his own moral responsibility to abstain from doing
"unjust, immoral, and cruel things," even though allowed by the law. 2
The citizen who acts in accord with obligation and responsibility is the
mature citizen, the complete political man, the only person who is
"free" in the positive sense. Call this the "civic virtue understanding"
of the relationship between rights and obligations: our obligations are
paramount. They not only undergird our rights but also require us to
forego them sometimes.
8 Id. at 383.
9. Id. at 383-84.
10. Cf. id. at 145, 150, 384 n.1 (making various references to the mutuality and
reciprocity of rights guaranteed by the state).
11. Cf. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale LJ. 16, 30-32 (1913) (positing a theory of
"jural opposites" under which a right for A entails an obligation for B).
12. 2 Lieber, supra note 6, at 149; see also 1 Lieber, supra note 6, at 401-02 (stating
that every citizen owes duties of "justice" to other citizens; even if not required by
law, one must give one's colleague his "due").
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A third meaning is consistent with and even suggested by the
foregoing passages but may go beyond Lieber's own thinking. 3
Under this reading, citizenship entails a web of interconnected rights
and obligations. Rights and obligations are not just reciprocal, they
are interwoven; citizenship in the polity entails a web of communal
bonding and individual security. Ex ante, rights can help create the
conditions for obligations to be carried out and a spirit of dutifulness
inculcated; obligations, can in turn, create conditions for mutual
respect among citizens that facilitate the operation of rights. Call this
the "pragmatic understanding" of the relationship between rights and
obligations. A crude example of the pragmatic understanding comes
from the most famous lawyer in America at the time when Lieber
published the Manual, Roger Taney, Chief Justice of the United
States from 1836 to 1864.
The original Constitution mentions national citizenship only in the
presidential qualification clause, 4 but in two places importantly
deploys the idea of state citizenship. Article IV assures "Citizens of
each State... all the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States."15 This clause prohibits state discrimination against
citizens of other states: a citizen of Virginia passing through or doing
business in Maryland could not be denied legal privileges or
immunities then enjoyed by citizens of Maryland. Article III extends
the "judicial Power" of the United States to various kinds of cases and
controversies, including "Controversies ... between Citizens of
different States." 6 The most famous construction of this diversity of
state citizenship element of federal jurisdiction was Chief Justice
Taney's opinion for the Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford,17 decided
almost twenty years after Lieber's treatise. Dred Scott had sued in
federal court, invoking the court's diversity jurisdiction to seek a
judicial declaration of his emancipation because he claimed
citizenship in a free state. 8 The first issue was: "Can a negro, whose
ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as slaves, become
a member of the political community formed and brought into
13. This meaning is based on my reading of the Manual and on the burgeoning
Lieber scholarship, notably the Cardozo Law Review symposium on his Legal and
Political Hermeneutics, see Michael Herz, Rediscovering Francis Lieber: An Aftervord
and Introduction, 16 Cardozo L. Rev. 2107 (1995), as well as Maura I. Strassberg,
Distinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 75
N.C. L. Rev. 1501, 1515-24 (1997), especially her meticulous link between Lieber's
theory and Hegel's.
14. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
15. Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
16. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Various other heads of jurisdiction also rely on
citizenship of states or foreign states. Nowhere does Article III speak explicitly of
national citizenship.
17. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). See generally Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case:
Its Significance in American Law and Politics (1978).
18. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 396-99,400.
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existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such
become entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities,
guarantied [sic] by that instrument to the citizen?" 9 Taney ruled that
a black man descended from slaves could not be a "citizen" for
purposes of Article III.2
The Chief Justice's opinion presented a thorough case for the
proposition that the framers of the Constitution considered people of
African descent incapable of holding citizenship and having rights. At
the most general level, Taney argued, slaves were legally invisible to
the founding generation. Even Native Americans, who could be
naturalized by Congress, could not be made "citizens in a civilized
community."21 Hence, it went without saying that the descendants of
African slaves, who could not even be naturalized,2 would
presumptively not be citizens under the Constitution.- Having
established this as the baseline, Taney examined specific legal sources
contemporary with the founding generation, starting with a 1792
statute (adopted by a Congress filled with constitutional framers)
requiring every "free able-bodied white male citizen" to be enrolled in
the militia.24 This was evidence that "the African race" owes
allegiance to the United States, "but it is repudiated, and rejected
from the duties and obligations of citizenship in marked language." ' -
Dred Scott was the leading legal examination of citizenship before
the Civil War. The first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment-the
citizenship clause-overrides this holding of Dred Scott. Not only did
former slaves become citizens by operation of this clause, but
thereafter people of African descent were eligible to become
citizens. 26 The importance of the citizenship right was illustrated by
the Chinese exclusion cases. In the early cases, the Supreme Court
19. Id at 403.
20. Id. at 406.
21. Id. at 420.
22. Cf. An Act to Establish An Uniform Rule of Naturalization, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103
(1790) (America's first naturalization law, providing that "any alien, being a free
white person," might be naturalized).
23. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 420. Taney therefore created as a baseline presumption
"the line of division which the Constitution has drawn between the citizen race, who
formed and held the Government, and the African race, which they held in subjection
and slavery, and governed at their own pleasure." Id.
24. Id (quotation omitted).
25. Id.; see also id. at 420-21 (noting an 1813 law, 2 Stat. 809, providing that U.S.
ships could only employ "citizens of the United States, or persons of color," and an
1820 law authorizing the District of Columbia's government to enact special
legislation for disorderly conduct by "slaves, free negroes, and mulattoes"). Taney
stated: "This law, like the laws of the States, shows this class of persons were
governed by special legislation directed expressly to them, and always connected with
provisions for the government of slaves, and not with those for the government of free
white citizens." Id. at 421.
26. See Naturalization Act of 1870, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254 (1870) (opening
naturalization to "aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent-).
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upheld Congress' power to expel as well as exclude noncitizens-
including Chinese residents of the United States-as a necessary
attribute of national sovereignty. In United States v. Wong Kim
Ark,"s however, the Court interpreted the citizenship clause to apply
to the children of Chinese noncitizens who were born in the United
States.29 Because they were constitutional "citizens," those children
were not subject to expulsion, even though their parents were. 0
The second sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment assures that
"[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States"-the third
time in the Constitution that citizens are identified as being "of the
United States."31 This provision has enjoyed a surprisingly marginal
interpretive history.32 The Supreme Court in The Slaughterhouse
Cases33 confirmed that the citizenship clause overrode Dred Scott, but
rejected a broad reading of the privileges or immunities clause that
would have policed state regulation of local monopolies. 4  The
Court's fear was that recognizing all fundamental economic rights as
constitutionally cognizable privileges or immunities would essentially
federalize state regulatory policy.35 That holding seems essentially
correct but does not preclude a narrower reading of the privileges or
immunities clause. The Slaughterhouse Cases need not be overturned,
as many law professors argue they should be,36 to read that precedent
for the narrower proposition that the "privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States" are those entailing obligations as well as
rights that set apart the full membership in the political community
from the outsider, or alien. Such a reading of the privileges or
immunities clause has the advantage of giving that clause a civic
27. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724 (1893); The Chinese
Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889). These cases are discussed in Owen M. Fiss,
Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State, 1888-1910, at 298-311 (1993) (volume VIII
of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United
States).
28. 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
29. Justice Horace Gray's learned opinion looked to the common law,
international practice, and constitutional history to resolve the unsettled issue,
discussed in Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 167 (1874), whether people born in the
United States were citizens even though their parents were not. Wong Kim Ark, 169
U.S. at 654-58.
30. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 704-05.
31. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). The first time citizens are so
identified is the presidential qualifications clause, id. art. II, § 1, cl. 4, the second is the
citizenship clause discussed above. See supra text accompanying notes 1, 14.
32. On the citizenship clause generally, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights
181-87 (1998).
33. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
34. Id. at 73, 80-81.
35. Id. at 76-82.
36. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, A History of the American
Constitution 297-319 (1990); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, 101 Yale L.J. 1385 (1992).
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reading that would have been analytically congenial to a lawyer in the
1860s. Although Taney's holding and the racist tradition embedded in
his Dred Scott opinion were overridden by the citizenship clause, the
mode of analysis-thinking about citizenship as a web of interrelated
obligations as well as rights-was not. That web would in the 1860s
have included service on juries and the armed forces, marriage, access
to the courts, and would today include voting and public education as
well.37
The Supreme Court's actual enforcement of these rights and
obligations has been tied to the due process and (especially) equal
protection clauses, not the privileges or immunities clause of Section
1. The due process and equal protection clauses protect "persons"
and not just "citizens." Thus, the Court applied the protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the Bill of Rights, to noncitizens
from China in the first generation after Reconstruction,' for reasons
suggested by the reciprocity understanding of rights and obligations:
"A resident, alien born, is entitled to the same protection under the
laws that a citizen is entitled to. He owes obedience to the laws of the
country in which he is domiciled, and, as a consequence, he is entitled
to the equal protection of those laws."39 Even though the United
States could expel noncitizens, it had to treat them fairly so long as
they were in this country.'
Pursuant to the civic virtue or pragmatic understanding of rights
and obligations I have derived from Lieber, the Court's jurisprudence
ought to read the equal protection clause differently, in some respects,
for citizens than for noncitizens. For citizens, the Court ought to insist
upon military service, jury service, marriage, and contract rights as a
package of rights and obligations that the states are essentially
prohibited from apportioning on a discriminatory basis-not just
because such discrimination denies citizens important benefits, but
also because it denies them the respect and community bonding
entailed in their assuming the obligations of citizenship. This would
entail the pragmatic understanding of rights and obligations, which I
shall show to be roughly consistent with the Court's general
37. See infra Part II. The list of rights and obligations in the text would make the
Fourteenth Amendment's clause cover different "privileges" and "immunities" than
Article IV's clause, just as the current stingy interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's clause does. The different readings could be justified by the different
purposes of the clauses: Article IV seeks to assure national union by discouraging the
states from discriminating against out-of-staters, while the Fourteenth Amendment
seeks to assure the conditions of citizenship for in-staters.
38. See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (applying Bill of
Rights to protect citizens of China from being unlawfully detained in the United
States); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (applying the equal protection
clause to protect citizens of China living in the United States).
39. Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 242 (Field, J., concurring in part).
40. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724-25 (1893) (distinguishing
Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 356).
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jurisprudence of equal protection. A civic virtue understanding of
that relationship would not be judicially enforceable per se, but would
provide constitutional support for more aggressive political measures,
such as legal requirements that citizens vote, serve on juries, and serve
in the armed forces. The civic virtue understanding has also
traditionally been the conceptual underpinning for the right to marry,
although recent decisions suggest that is no longer the case.
II. A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE SUPREME COURT'S EQUAL
PROTECTION CASE LAW IN LIGHT OF PRAGMATIC
UNDERSTANDINGS OF RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
Part I adds one further reason supporting the proposition that The
Slaughterhouse Cases ought to be limited to their facts and the
Fourteenth Amendment's privileges or immunities clause be given
teeth. 2 The Supreme Court can do that without much violence to
precedent, and a principle of civic obligation provides a way to limit
the federal intrusion into state regulation, the legitimate concern of
the Slaughterhouse Court. Under that principle, pragmatically
conceived, the privileges or immunities of national citizenship
enforceable against one's domicile state (as opposed to Article IV's
privileges and immunities of state citizenship when one moves from
one state to another) would be those rights that most closely entail
civic obligations as well, including jury service, voting, military service,
marriage, education, and access to courts and the rule of law.
Assume that the Court does not choose to extend the privileges or
immunities clause in this way. The understandings of civic obligation
described in Part I are still potentially relevant as an interpretive
principle explaining the Supreme Court's construction of the equal
protection clause, in particular. As Daniel Ortiz has argued, the cases
can be sorted in a way not otherwise justified by the text: state
policies abridging fundamental interests are, as a practical matter,
subject to closer scrutiny than policies abridging other kinds of
interests, including in some cases interests that seem important to
many people.43 The principle of civic obligation helps us identify
which interests are most fundamental and must be guarded with
special care by the judiciary-namely those rights imbricated with
moral or legal obligations: jury service, voting, military service, and
marriage. This principle already finds explicit expression in some of
the case law and provides a useful conceptual way of understanding
some otherwise puzzling precedents. Furthermore, thinking about the
interrelation between rights and responsibilities as integral to the case
41. See discussion infra Part 11.5.
42. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
43. See Daniel Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 Stan. L. Rev.
1105, 1137 (1989).
1728 [Vol. 69
OBLIGATIONS AND RIGHTS OF CITIZENS
law provides an internal-to-the-law fulcrum for criticizing a few of the
cases. Finally, my earlier distinction between reciprocity and civic
virtue understandings of civic obligation help us see how some of the
cases can be viewed dialectically: the pragmatic and reciprocity
understanding is the dominant theme of the Court's jurisprudence,
but the civic virtue understanding persists as a minor theme that
enriches the cases.
As the gentle reader ponders this thesis, consider several lines of
cases that the idea of civic obligation illuminates.
1. The Jury Cases
The foregoing thesis is most clearly and persistently a theme in the
jury selection cases; indeed, you cannot make sense of the cases
without viewing them through the lens of civic obligations as well as
civil rights. Among the earliest equal protection cases were those
addressing laws excluding African Americans from juries. '  In
Strauder v. West Virginia,4 the Supreme Court ruled that a state law
limiting juries to "white male persons"' violated the equal protection
clause, because it was a blatant discrimination against people of color
and "practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of
their inferiority."'47 My view is that Dred Scott provided important
background for this unexplained assertion: like the early federal
statutes excluding people of color from military obligations, newer
laws excluding them from juries undermined their status as citizens
because it excluded them from a key obligation of citizenship. Even
though the Supreme Court subsequently upheld racial segregation
policies in transportation and education, it never retreated from
Strauder, in part because jury service was an appurtenance of
citizenship in ways that transportation and education were not then
perceived to be.' Exclusion from jury service expressed a profound
44. Ironically, southern states excluded people of color from juries right after they
had (under pressure from the Reconstruction Congress) adopted laws allowing
people of color to testify in court. See George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector,
107 Yale L.J. 575, 658, 672-97 (1997).
45. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
46. Id at 305.
47. Id. at 308; see also 18 U.S.C. § 243 (codifying an Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114,
§ 4, 18 Stat. 336, a Reconstruction era law making it a crime to exclude persons fromjury service because of their race, discussed in Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 321
(1880)). Cf Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 388-89 (1881) (stating that the right of a
juror to serve provides a basis for constitutional intervention).
48. There is this potential difference between Strauder, 100 U.S. 303, and Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896): the former was a complete exclusion, while the latter
was a segregation. The states, of course, would not have adopted a policy whereby
criminal prosecutions of black defendants would have been heard by all-black juries,




disrespect for people of color as citizens and deprived them of an
important obligation by which they could show their worth as citizens.
In practice, unfortunately, people of color were kept off juries
through the discriminatory administration of the criminal and civil
justice system. The Supreme Court was lethargic in policing this
practice for several generations but showed stronger interest after
World War II, for reasons expressed by Justice Frankfurter in his
dissent in Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.:5 citizens of color should not
be arbitrarily excluded from jury venires, "partly as assurance of a
diffused impartiality" in the functioning of the jury, and "partly
because sharing in the administration of justice is a phase of civic
responsibility."'" Agreeing with Frankfurter's general idea, the Court
extended it beyond the racial context to hold that an exclusion from
jury venires of people who worked for a daily wage, and therefore
would suffer financially from jury service, could not be justified. "Jury
service is a duty as well as a privilege of citizenship; it is a duty that
cannot be shirked on a plea of inconvenience or decreased earning
power. 5 2
Even when people of color were represented in jury venires,
prosecutors often struck them from actual service through peremptory
challenges, a process the Court left unregulated for a longer period of
time .5  Finally, in Batson v. Kentucky,5 4 the Court struck down a
prosecutor's discriminatory deployment of peremptory challenges
during jury selection from an unchallenged venire.5 Justice Powell's
opinion justified judicial monitoring of peremptory challenges mainly
by reference to the need to assure defendants a representative and
impartial jury and to preserve the legitimacy of the jury system, with
only a brief mention of the juror's interest.56  Powell's cursory
treatment may reflect the common attitude that jury service is a pain
in the neck rather than a civic opportunity-an attitude that should
not be encouraged, and certainly not by the nation's highest court.
The principle of civic obligation helps explain why peremptory
challenges should be monitored so intrusively.57 It also provides the
49. See Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953).
50. 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
51. Id. at 227 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 224 (opinion of the Court).
53. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,221-22 (1965) (holding that federal courts
are not to inquire into the motives for prosecutors' peremptory challenges to jurors).
54. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
55. Id. at 89.
56. See id. at 87.
57. Civic obligation also serves as a response to Chief Justice Burger's concern
that judicial monitoring would intrude into the liberty of litigants to challenge jurors
without giving reasons. See id. at 118-31 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The principle also
lends support to Justice Marshall's proposal that peremptory challenges be abolished
(they are creatures of statute) and that challenges for cause be expanded as a check
on juror bias. See id. at 105-08 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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key justification for the Court's extension of Batson to race-based
peremptory challenges by private defense or civil case attorneys (who
are not state actors in the way prosecutors are). Because the juror's
interest in carrying out his civic obligation is entailed in peremptory
challenges, and because the whole judicial process is involved in
excusing him, race-based strikes in the context of state trial
proceedings ought to be unconstitutional whoever exercises them, as
the Supreme Court has firmly held.' Similarly, it is unconstitutional
for a prosecutor to strike jurors of the same race as the defendant,
because "[j]ury service is an exercise of responsible citizenship" to
which the citizen as juror has both a right and a responsibility.5
In Strauder, the Court observed that the state could exclude women
from service on juries, even if not people of color. ' This dictum is
strikingly inconsistent with the principle of civic obligation: women
were citizens in 1880, but second-class ones because they were
considered too home-bound or ill-suited to participate in the serious
public business of jury deliberation. This was a reflection of the
separate spheres notion, whereby women were considered best-suited
to domestic duties and men to public ones.6" Even after they acquired
the right to vote, women were either excluded from juries or, if
allowed to serve, were excused if they chose to opt out.(-2 It was not
until Taylor v. Louisiana'3 that the Supreme Court invalidated this
system-to protect the "civic responsibility" interests of the jurors as
well as the fair trial interests of the litigants.'
In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,5 the Court extended Batson to
require judicial monitoring of sex-based peremptory challenges.'
This would appear a logical extension, now that sex has joined race as
a classification requiring heightened equal protection scrutiny, but the
dissenting opinion raised a pertinent objection. Because there are, as
a matter of convention, just two sexes pretty equally apportioned
across the population, the fairness of trials ought not be affected by
58. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), followed in Georgia
v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (holding that race-based strikes by criminal defense
counsel constitute state action).
59. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991). But see id. at 418 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (dissenting apparently because he viewed the discrimination as affecting
only the criminal defendant).
60. 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879).
61. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, I.,
concurring).
62 See Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 289-90 (1947) (stating that fifteen of
twenty-eight states allowing women to serve allowed them to be excused).
63. 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (effectively overruling Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57
(1961)).
64. Id at 530-31 (quoting Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
65. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
66. Id. at 129-31.
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sex-based challenges: if the prosecutor strikes men, the defense
counsel can strike women in paternity cases such as J.E.B. (where
men could be expected to be more lenient to the putative father than
women). Hence, the state's and the litigants' interests in trial fairness
were not implicated so strongly as they were in Batson.67 Justice
Blackmun's opinion for the Court responded with the civic interests of
the jurors struck by reason of their sex: as long as the Court adhered
to the view that sex discrimination against men as well as women is
unconstitutional when exercised by the state, the jurors themselves
had an interest in not having a "'brand upon them, affixed by the law,
an assertion of their inferiority"' or bias in deciding a matter of
importance. 6s
2. The Voting Cases
The Supreme Court in Minor v. Happersett69 interpreted the
privileges or immunities clause to have no bearing on state laws
depriving women of the right to vote.7° The Court announced a weak
understanding of citizenship, as "membership of a nation, and nothing
more." 71 This dictum, narrowly conceived, had a short life, as it was
implicitly renounced in Wong Kim Ark 2 and other nonexpulsion
cases, but the Court's specific holding made originalist sense: when
the Constitution and the Reconstruction Amendments were adopted,
states excluded many citizens from voting, and so the Fourteenth
Amendment's term "citizen" did not entail that particular right.73
Moreover, when the slaves, assured their freedom under the
Thirteenth Amendment, were made citizens by the Fourteenth
Amendment's citizenship clause, Congress still felt it incumbent upon
them to guarantee these new citizens' right to vote through a
subsequent amendment, the Fifteenth.74 And of course, it took the
Nineteenth Amendment, forbidding discrimination on account of sex
in state and national voting rules,75  to override Happersett.
Conversely, the Court's reasoning, which delinks citizenship from
voting, has been superseded. The supervening constitutional
67. See id. at 160 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 142 (opinion of the Court) (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303, 308 (1879)).
69. 88 U.S. 162 (1874).
70. Id. at 171-72.
71. Id. at 166.
72. 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (holding that children of noncitizens born in the United
States are citizens of the United States).
73. Happersett, 88 U.S. at 172-77.
74. U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude").
75. Id. amend. XIX, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex").
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developments provide important support for the doctrinal importance
of a principle of civic obligation.
The Constitution itself has been repeatedly amended to assure the
"right of citizens of the United States to vote."76 The document has
thereby changed in ways that negate Happersett's premise that voting
and citizenship are not linked: while they were not associated in 1789
or 1868, they are in 2001. Thus voting ought now to be treated as an
interest implicated by the civic obligation idea. The Supreme Court
has so recognized. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections," for
example, anticipated the Twenty-Fourth Amendment in striking down
poll taxes. The Court ruled that "'the political franchise of voting' [is]
a 'fundamental political right, because [it is] preservative of all
rights."'78 The Court has extended Harper to strike down most laws
requiring property ownership in limited purpose elections79 and most
durational residence requirements. ' All these cases reflect the idea
that "[a]ny unjustified discrimination in determining who may
participate in political affairs or in the selection of public officials
undermines the legitimacy of representative government."',
Today, there are few direct and general exclusions from the right to
vote in our polity, and they are tailored to the civic obligation
principle. The main exclusions are for noncitizens, people under the
age of eighteen, and people convicted of serious crimes.' The first
exclusion, of course, reflects the distinction between the reciprocity
and other understandings of right and obligation. The state owes
noncitizens due process and equal protection of laws that they are
charged xvith obeying, but does not owe them the right to vote. The
right to vote is brigaded with various obligations and other rights, and
partly for that reason limited to people who have a more permanent
and weblike relationship to the polity. The reciprocity understanding
could justify extending the franchise to noncitizens for some purposes,
such as the election of school boards in districts where noncitizens pay
76. See id. amend. XV, § 1 (citizens' right to vote shall not be abridged on account
of race or color); id. amend. XIX (right shall not be abridged on account of sex); id.
amend. XXIV (right shall not be abridged by reason of failure to pay a poll or other
tax); id. amend. XXVI (right shall not be abridged on account of age, so long as the
citizen is eighteen years or older).
77. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
7& Id. at 667 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,370 (1886)).
79. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969), followed in
Quinn v. MilUsap, 491 U.S. 95 (1989); Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970);
Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969). But distinguished in Ball v. James, 451 U.S.
355 (1981); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719
(1973).
80. See, eg., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
81. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 626.
82. Many, and probably most, states have similar exclusions for jury service. See,
e.g., Rubio v. Superior Court, 593 P.2d 595 (Cal. 1979) (upholding jury exclusions for
noncitizens and people convicted of felonies).
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taxes and send their children to school, but the civic obligation
principle assures that this possibility ought not be a constitutional
requirement, because noncitizens have not made the permanent
commitment to our polity and corresponding obligations (jury and
military service) that citizens have. It is for this reason that the
Supreme Court has ruled that states cannot discriminate generally
against hiring noncitizens for the civil service but can do so for offices
that are at "the heart of representative government." 83
The idea underlying the second exclusion is that people under a
certain age are not mature enough to assume the obligations as well as
rights of citizenship. (Recall the bar or bat mitzvah.) This exclusion is
tailored to the civic obligation principle, in fact. People who are
sixteen or seventeen years old, whom the Twenty-Sixth Amendment
allows to be excluded from voting, are typically just as well informed
as eighteen year olds, whom the amendment assures the right to vote.
So there is not a huge liberal reason to draw the line at age eighteen.
The best reason (I can think of) is that eighteen year olds have
traditionally been subject to compulsory military service, and were
risking their lives in Vietnam when that amendment was proposed
and ratified in 1971. The killer argument for lowering the voting age
in this country was one grounded in civic obligation: if they are old
enough to die for their country, they are old enough to vote.
Nearly half the states have laws excluding citizens convicted of
serious crimes from voting or holding elective office.' These laws
would appear questionable under purely liberal premises: once the
felon has paid his debt to society, he should be free to rejoin the
polity. Yet the Supreme Court upheld such exclusionary laws in
Richardson v. Ramirez.' The Court distinguished Harper on the
ground that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly
contemplated that the states can deny the right to vote by reason of
"participation in rebellion [i.e., the Civil War], or other crime. 's6
Therefore, the framers of Section 1 of the amendment could not have
intended for the right to vote to be absolute. Section 2 is an example
of the civic obligation principle, which can (as the Court held) justify
the voting exclusion in a broad array of cases: committing particularly
heinous crimes shows such disregard of civic obligations that the felon
is not morally capable of assuming the full rights of citizenship. The
civic obligation principle also suggests judicial monitoring of this kind
83. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 222 (1984) (quoting Cabell v. Chavez-Salido,
454 U.S. 432, 439 (1982)). Compare Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (states
cannot generally discriminate), with Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (state can
discriminate against noncitizens in public school teacher hiring).
84. See Steven B. Snyder, Let My People Run: The Rights of Voters and
Candidates Under State Laws Barring Felons from Holding Elective Office, 4 J.L. &
Pol. 543 app. A (1988).
85. 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
86. Id. at 43.
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of exclusion, as in Hunter v. Undervood, ' where a unanimous Court
struck down exclusion of felons on the ground that it was motivated
by racial animus.88
3. The Military Service Cases
Matters of citizenship and the armed forces have traditionally been
decided by Congress and the President, typically implementing the
civic obligation principle in the military sphere before the Supreme
Court was willing to implement it in other arenas. During the Civil
War, for example, President Lincoln ended the exclusion of African-
Americans from the armed forces-the policy that had formed a basis
for the Article Ill holding in Dred Scott.' Given Reconstruction's
commitment to citizenship for the freed slaves, the exclusion was not
revived afterward and was considered a necessary accompaniment of
the Reconstruction Amendments. As W.E.B. DuBois later put it,
"[n]othing else made Negro citizenship conceivable, but the record of
the Negro soldier as a fighter." 9 Unfortunately, people of color were
segregated in the armed forces. It is notable that the U.S. military was
desegregated, by order of President Truman, before the Supreme
Court ruled that apartheid was unconstitutional in state and District
of Columbia public schools. The justification for desegregation was
strongly influenced by the civic obligation idea: as soldiers of color
were risking their lives and contributing to a war against racist
totalitarianism, it was intolerable that they not carry out their
obligations side by side with white soldiers.
Similarly, the United States armed forces admitted women for
service-as nurses and in 1917 as "yeomen" auxiliaries-before the
Nineteenth Amendment admitted women to the voting booth." Like
people of color, women served in their own special units.
Desegregation of the armed forces came more slowly for women than
for people of color, and women have never been subject to the draft in
this country-a key obligation of citizenship. When President Carter
prepared for a possible confrontation with the Soviet Union in 1980,
he proposed requiring both women and men to register for a potential
87. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
88. Id. at 233. That ground was surely sufficient, but a supporting ground would
be the idea that some of the crimes triggering the exclusion (such as consensual
sodomy or indecency) are ones whose seriousness is nowadays discredited. Even if
Alabama can make consensual sodomy a misdemeanor, as it now does, the civic
obligation principle strongly augurs against doing so.
89. See generally Bernard C. Nalty, Strength for the Fight: A History of Black
Americans in the Military (1986); Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the
Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 499 (1991) [hereinafter Karst,
The Pursuit of Manhood].
90. W.E.B. DuBois, Black Reconstruction in America 104 (1935).
91. See generally Jeanne Holm, Women in the Military: An Unfinished
Revolution (1982); Judith Hicks Stiehm, Arms and the Enlisted Woman (1989).
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draft, but Congress vetoed the idea. The Supreme Court in Rostker v.
Goldberg' upheld the registration law agreed upon by Congress and
the President against a sex discrimination claim. The Court's
rationale was deference to the political process as to matters of
military preparedness.93 Here, the principle of civic obligation would
register a dissent. The complete exclusion of women from an
undeniable responsibility of citizenship is an affront to women as
citizens, a bow to their continued (symbolic) infantilization.94 This
kind of symbolic action and its unquestionable link to citizenship-
going back to the early militia statutes and memorably codified in
Dred Scott-are precisely the kinds of issues where the Court is well
situated to lead the political process. It is true that the Court defers to
that process on military preparedness issues, but the best reason for
deference is that the Court is not competent to second-guess the
judgment of military experts. This reason provides little cover for
Rostker, though, because the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified that
"[w]omen should be required to register.., in order for us to have an
inventory of what the available strength is within the military qualified
pool in this country. '95 Accordingly, the deference argument ought
not to have been strong enough to sustain a registration law that
"categorically exclude[d] women from a fundamental civic
obligation."96
4. The Education Cases
It is unlikely that the Reconstruction framers expected the
Fourteenth Amendment to affect public education, which was not the
universal practice in 1868 that it is today. But the twentieth century
saw education emerge as a key service provided by local and state
governments, and a learned citizenry is now considered essential for
rational self-government. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the
lawsuits that brought down apartheid as a formal policy were brought
in the context of public schools, first at the university level and then at
the elementary and secondary level. Thus, the key analytical move in
Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court in Brown v. Board of
92. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
93. Id. at 64-72.
94. I mean this: military service limited to men owes something to the tradition of
war as a campaign to protect the "women and children" at home. By constitutionally
reaffirming this exclusion, the Court and Congress were not only denying women one
of the responsibilities of adult citizenship, but they were denying it for reasons linked
with this traditional trope. See Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood, supra note 89, at 503-
06 (arguing that armed forces' exclusions and segregations of women cater to notions
linking citizenship to "manhood").
95. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 99 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting the Army Chief,
followed by similar remarks from each of the other Joint Chiefs).
96. Id. at 86.
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Education,97 was his characterization of public education as "the very
foundation of good citizenship," which "is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in
the armed forces." 98 The right that Warren recognized for plaintiff
Linda Brown was one inherently tied to obligations-those of Brown
to attend school, of her parents to enforce that attendance and to
assist in her education, and of the state to provide adequate schools
for the purpose. Linda Brown's obligation to attend school was a
prerequisite to her ability to carry out her future adult obligations of
citizenship.
Brown's arguable recognition of education as a fundamental right
was reinterpreted in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez.9  The Court in the later case ruled that documented
inequalities in education levels across different school districts did not,
standing alone, justify beady-eyed equal protection scrutiny.10 As in
The Slaughterhouse Cases, the Court's concern was that a broadly
defined fundamental right under the equal protection clause would
federalize matters traditionally and properly left to state and local
regulation. 10 1 A pragmatic understanding of civic obligation is open to
this notion, with the caution suggested by Justice Powell's opinion for
the Court, that a complete denial of educational opportunities to
citizens, or a denial of the chance to learn the "basic minimal skills"
needed in our polity could be constitutionally objectionable."
The next case, Plyler v. Doe,103 is conceptually the most interesting.
Mindful of Rodriguez' dicta warning against gross deprivations of
minimal educational opportunities for citizens, and of the holding in
Wong Kim Ark that noncitizens' children born in this country are
citizens, Texas adopted a law denying public education to children
who were themselves "not legally admitted" to the United States.'
In his opinion for a closely divided Court, Justice Brennan ruled the
law unconstitutional.105  His opinion is famously eclectic; most
interesting to me is how it invokes all three understandings of the
relationship between rights and duties. Thus, Brennan appealed to
the reciprocity understanding with this argument: because noncitizens
(both parents and their children) underutilize state resources while
97. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Brown disapproved of and essentially overruled Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), a transportation case, and implicitly overruled
Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 (1899), an education
case.
98. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
99. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
100. Id at 44-55.
101. Id. at 50; see also supra text accompanying note 35.
102. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37.
103. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
104. Id. at 205 (citing Tex. Educ. Code ann. § 21.031 (Vernon Supp. 1981)).
105. Id. at 227-30.
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contributing labor to local economies, it was fundamentally unfair to
deny them any access to schooling.Y6 The opinion also appealed to
civic virtue and pragmatic understandings: because many
(realistically, most) of these children would remain in the community
for the rest of their lives, the state's denying them even a minimal
education would disable them from becoming productive and socially
mobile members of society; this would risk the creation of a pre-
ordained underclass of people. 7  Justice Blackmun's concurring
opinion also reflected this complex understanding of the increasingly
interconnected relationship of these children and the country if they
remained here, as was likely. Like Brennan, Blackmun emphasized
the "special place" education must occupy in the Fourteenth
Amendment, because, as Brown held, it is a precondition to one's
political rights and responsibilities."' 8
The most remarkable feature of Plyler is that the Court's majority
applied something beyond the reciprocity understanding of rights and
obligations to people who were not citizens, but whose life trajectories
did augur increasing connections with our polity-and therefore
conjured up a pragmatic understanding of their obligations and rights
as well. Dissenting in the leading Chinese expulsion case, Justice
David Brewer recalled the old English term for this kind of person:
"A denizen is in a kind of middle state, between an alien and a
natural-born subject, and partakes of both of them."' 9 Ironically,
Plyler may be a good argument for leaving the citizenship and
privileges and immunities clauses dormant, for the equal protection
clause's more capacious ambit-"person"-can bring within it
citizens, denizens, and noncitizens alike, but with different
applications through the different ways of thinking about obligations
and rights.
5. The Marriage Cases
Although the right to marry would seem least amenable to a
citizenship analysis, its case law provides the richest array of
possibilities. To begin, Justice Curtis dissented in Dred Scott on the
ground that Scott had "enter[ed] into a lawful contract of marriage,
attended with the civil rights and duties which belong to that
condition," which necessarily implied his emancipation and potential
citizenship.' As Professor Maura Strassberg has shown, Curtis'
106. See id. at 228.
107. See id. at 219-23. Reconciling the different treatments of education in Brown
and Rodriguez, Brennan ruled that education is neither a fundamental right nor just
another benefit. Id. at 221-23.
108. See id. at 233-34 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
109. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 736 (1893) (Brewer, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added); see also Fiss, supra note 27, at 312.
110. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 601 (1856) (Curtis, J.,
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thesis may owe something to Lieber's understanding of marriage as
fundamental to the polity because its stringent obligations both reflect
and inculcate the civic virtue distinctive to citizenship." ' Echoing
Hegel and other continental thinkers, Lieber maintained that
marriage was the sound basis for the civic republic, because it
promotes the development of "sociality" and self-sacrifice for the
common good on the part of the family members, especially the
husband." 2
In its post-Reconstruction cases upholding criminal and other
penalties for polygamy, the Supreme Court explicitly invoked Lieber
as support for the idea that plural marriage undermines the social
fabric and democracy itself; only monogamous marriage is consistent
with the democratic spirit.113  To the extent they were following
Lieber, these early precedents seem to view marriage not as a liberal
right associated with state-citizen reciprocity, but as a civic republican
right associated with the common good-indeed obligatorily
associated. Furthermore, the cases are textbook illustrations of the
pragmatic understanding of interlinked rights and responsibilities.
The federal government, which had plenary control over the territory
of Utah where the (Mormon) polygamists were concentrated, not only
made the relationships a crime against society, but also deprived
polygamists-and even people who advocated such practices-of the
rights to vote, hold office, and serve on juries."' Immigration laws of
the period excluded people who practiced polygamy," 5 and the armed
forces probably excluded such people as well.
These civic virtue features receded from the cases in the next
century. In the contraception cases, which were ostensibly brought to
enable married couples to enjoy nonprocreative sex, Justice Douglas
tied the autonomy of the marital union, with its "harmony in living"
and "bilateral loyalty,"'1 6 to the "'democratic understanding of social
good and with the actual make-up of the human community.""' 7 The
dissenting). See Lea VanderVelde & Sandhya Subramanian, Mrs. Dred Scott, 106
Yale L.J. 1033, 1100-09 (1997), for a most illuminating discussion of the key role that
marriage played in the two lawsuits, one by Dred Scott and the other by his wife.
111. See Strassberg, supra note 13, at 1511-23.
112. See 1 Lieber, supra note 6, at 102-04. Lieber even saw a connection between
family and patriotism: "As he has affection for the members of the same family, so he
found them enlarged into affections for a wider society, he felt himself mingled with
it, with its recollections, its history, and its future destiny." Id. at 107.
113. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165-66 (1878) (citing Professor
Lieber).
114. All laws were upheld by the Supreme Court. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333
(1890); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885).
115. See Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477: Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, §
1, 26 Stat. 1084.
116. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,486 (1965) (Douglas, J.).
117. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting
Robert L. Calhoun, Democracy and Natural Law, 5 Nat. Law. F. 31, 36 (1960)).
2001] 1739
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
rhetoric recalled Lieber's conclusions, but not his particular analysis.
Beginning with its decision in Loving v. Virginia,"8 which recognized
the "freedom to marry" by different-race couples," 9 the Supreme
Court has tended to view marriage more as a liberal right than as a
civic obligation or a community need.' In my view, the latter theme
is merely suppressed and not absent from the decisions. Thus, the
pragmatic understanding of rights and obligations would have
provided useful support for the Court's cryptic due process right to
marry holding in Loving and would have tied it more closely to the
Court's equal protection holding. Virginia's criminalization of
different-race marriage was both an invidious race discrimination
linked to the philosophy of white supremacy (the equal protection
holding) and a state effort to denigrate the citizenship of integrative
couples like the Lovings by denying their ability to enter into serious
mutual obligations (the due process holding).
Contrast a civic virtue understanding of the right to marry, for it
would hold that the state has an obligation to provide marriage as an
institution for its citizens, to encourage marriage through liberal
benefits, and to discourage divorce through procedural entailments at
least. The Supreme Court cases in the last generation have
abandoned this kind of thinking about marriage.
In contrast, the pragmatic understanding has not been so
renounced. In Turner v. Safley,' for example, the Court ruled that
states could not deny prisoners the right to marry as a general rule,
but said (in dicta) that states did have discretion to attach marriage
limitations tailored to particular prisoners' crimes.122 This condition is
defensible for the same reason states can deny felons the right to vote:
the breach of important social and legal obligations suggests an
inability to carry out one's duties of citizenship, and a denigrated
status is an appropriate state response.
One case ought to be reconsidered, however. In Zablocki v.
Redhail,"3 the Court held that states could not deny remarriage to
spouses who were in arrears in their child or spousal support
payments. 24 The Court's holding reflects an excessively liberal
understanding of marriage as simply a choice that citizens can make
118. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
119. Id. at 12.
120. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987) (holding that prisoners have a
restricted right to marry, primarily because of the legal rights and benefits associated
with it); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1978) (holding that deadbeat dads
have a right to marry).
121. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
122. Id. at 96-98; see also Butler v. Wilson, 415 U.S. 953 (1974), af)'g mer. Johnson
v. Rockefeller, 365 F. Supp. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (three-judge court) (holding that the
state can restrict the marriage rights of felons as part of their punishment).
123. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
124. Id. at 375-77.
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and then shed virtually at will. A pragmatic understanding would
insist that the deadbeat dad, who reneges on his sworn obligations,
could be the proper object of state discipline. If he has shown bad
faith or incapacity in carrying out his preexisting obligations, the state
ought to be able to preclude him from entering into new ones and
ought to attach some stigma to any bad faith conduct.' "-'
6. The Access to Court and Contract Cases
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 expressly guaranteed the citizenship of
the former slaves 26 and assured them and their descendants that they
would be able to enter into contracts and leases on the same terms
and conditions as "white citizens. 1" 27 The 1866 statute was a template
for the Fourteenth Amendment, whose citizenship clause codified the
statute's initial guarantee and whose privileges or immunities and
equal protection clauses codified and expanded upon the assurance
that state courts would be open to all citizens for equal enforcement
of contractual and property rights, whatever the race or color of the
litigant. The Slaughterhouse dissenters would have expanded this
assurance to monitor a wide range of state regulations of the free
market. The core reading of the 1866 statute and the public value it
involved is that citizens must have nondiscriminatory access to courts
for enforcement of their voluntary agreements-and of course are
also obliged to follow the obligations they have themselves
undertaken.'28
Starting in 1968, the Supreme Court has construed the 1866 statute
to prohibit race discrimination by private parties (not just the state) in
property and contract transactions.129 This line of cases has been
persuasively criticized as inconsistent with the language and intent of
the Reconstruction Amendments.13 0 The principle of civic obligation
lends potential support to these cases, however. Contracts and leases
125. Contrast my criticism with the premodern stance taken by two concurring
Justices in Zablocki: they worried that the right to marry might undermine the ability
of the state to exclude same-sex and brother-sister couples from the institution. See id.
at 392 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 399 (Powell, J., concurring).
126. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (currently codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (1994)) ("That all persons born in the United States and not
subject to any foreign power... are hereby declared to be citizens of the United
States ").
127. See id.
128. This argument is just as consistent ith a reciprocity as with a pragmatic
understanding. For a defense of free access to courts as entailed in the petition clause
of the First Amendment, see United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 462-63 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
129. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (addressing private
property leases). The Court's holding was reaffirmed and extended to contract
dealings in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), and reaffirmed again by
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
130. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 452-76 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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create rights and obligations ultimately and immediately guaranteed
by the state's legal and judicial process. A benefit of being a citizen in
a political community is that you can expect other citizens to deal with
you without regard to your race or color; an obligation of being a
citizen is that you owe that same courtesy to those with whom you
deal.
III. THE NEXT FRONTIER, GAY PEOPLE'S RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS
The pragmatic understanding of the relationship of rights and
obligations not only provides a reason to give more bite to the
privileges or immunities clause (the first part of this article) or insights
as to certain features of the Court's equal protection jurisprudence
(second part), but also suggests a framework for thinking more
systematically about a constitutional frontier: equal citizenship for
gay, lesbian, and bisexual ("GLB") Americans. Like women and
people of color, GLB people have been denied fundamental rights of
citizenship and have sought to reclaim their citizenship by insisting on
their equal participation in jury service, the armed forces, and
marriage. Generally, gay claims for citizenship have been founded on
liberal baselines of formal equality, while opposition has been
asserted along republican lines, emphasizing a privileged place for the
(heterosexual) husband-wife family in our polity.131
The pragmatic understanding of the relationship between
obligations and rights helps us see why equality as to jury and military
service and, especially, marriage are particularly important to gay
people-and why the exclusion of gay people is particularly important
to some traditionalist people. As Roger Taney would remind GLB
people, they are not fully citizens until they are equally obligated as
well as equally entitled in their citizenship. The duties and benefits
described in this article-jury service, voting, military service,
education, marriage, contracts-are both badges and burdens of
citizenship. They are public marks of respect and dignity-and denying
any of this bundle of rights and responsibilities to gay people is a
public mark of disrespect. This premise lends straightforward support
to constitutional arguments for the inclusion of gay people in these
civic institutions. Consider three obvious applications.
The California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District recently
extended Batson132 and J.E.B.133 to require judicial monitoring of
peremptory challenges to lesbian and gay jurors as a matter of state
131. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Equality Practice: The Jurisprudence of
Civil Unions (forthcoming Routledge 2001) [hereinafter Eskridge, Equality Practice],
which examines liberal (ch. 4) and republican (ch. 5) arguments surrounding same-sex
marriage and civil unions.
132. See supra text accompanying supra notes 54-55.
133. See supra text accompanying supra notes 65-66.
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constitutional law."M The court ruled that lesbians and gay men
constitute a "cognizable group" whose exclusion would violate both
the parties' right to a representative jury and gay men's and lesbians'
rights and duties to serve on juries.'35 Most interestingly, the court
reasoned that:
in the long run, the greatest threat of failure to guarantee the rights
of gays and lesbians to serve on juries is to the commonwealth.... If
we deny that civic responsibility to any group, if we deny them the
"privilege of participating equally... in the administration of
justice," we deprive them of part of their membership in the
community, and while that has an immediate impact on the excluded
group, it must inevitably damage the community as well.'
A pragmatic or civic republican understanding of rights and
obligations also provides theoretical support for the Vermont
Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. State,'- holding that the state's
exclusion of same-sex couples from civil marriage was discrimination
invalid under the state constitution.'- Vermont's constitution has no
equal protection clause; the constitutional provision applied in Baker
was one requiring that government policy pursue "the common
benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or community,"
and not just "any single person, family, or set of persons, who are a
part only of that community."'39 The court unanimously held that
excluding lesbian and gay couples was not for the common benefit and
directed the legislature to create a statutory scheme extending "the
same rights and obligations provided by the law to married partners"
to same-sex couples."4 The legislature created a new institution of
civil unions, with all the same benefits and responsibilities of
marriage, for same-sex couples. While dissenters in the court and the
legislature cogently argued that formal equality required same-sex
marriage, 14 the statute was important because it imposed all the
obligations of marriage, as well as its benefits, on same-sex couples
who choose to enter into civil unions.
The application of the civic obligation principle to the federal
exclusion of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals from the armed forces"a
134. People v. Garcia, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339 (Ct. App. 2000).
135. Id. at 343-44.
136. Id. at 346 (quoting Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493,499 (1972)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
137. 744 A.2d 864, 868-89 (Vt. 1999) (citing 18 Vt. Stat. Ann. § 5131 (a)).
138. Id at 867.
139. Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 7.
140. Baker, 744 A.2d at 886.
141. See id at 897-912 (Johnson, J., dissenting in part); Eskridge, Equality Practice,
supra note 131, chs. 2 & 4 (presenting the story of the civil unions law and the liberal
critique).




would appear straightforward: like prior exclusions of women and
people of color, the exclusion of GLB people in effect disrespects
them as second-class citizens. All citizens should be able and obliged
to serve and help defend this country; any group-based exclusion
ought to be questioned closely. But the leading case, Thomasson v.
Perry,143 applied Rostker to this issue and found that as long as the
experts in the executive and legislative branches agreed that gays
would impair the effective functioning of the modern army, the
judiciary should be loath to intervene on abstract grounds such as
equal citizenship. 1" The Supreme Court has yet to address the issue.
In short, the pragmatic understanding provides strong reasons for
GLB people to insist on equal access to the obligations as well as the
rights of jury service, marriage, and military service: these matters are
essential to claims of equal citizenship and to the social assertion that
gay people are mature adults and not adolescent sex maniacs. 45 The
lesbian juror, the bisexual soldier, and the gay couple joined in civil
union engage in everyday performances of responsibility that
contribute to attitudes of somewhat greater respect for gay people
generally. Moreover, the community itself is better off if unjustified
divisions are erased from the duties of citizenship. Now as much as
ever before, the United States needs conscientious jurors, dedicated
soldiers, and committed couples (including the many GLB couples
that raise children) doing the hard work of nation-preservation.
At the same time, however, the pragmatic-and even more so the
civic virtue- understanding of the relationship between obligations
and rights helps us understand the continuing power of arguments
against equal citizenship for gay people.
1. Homosexuals as per se criminals
A key Clinton administration justification for excluding GLB
people from the armed forces was that because sodomy between
consenting adults is a felony under military law, such people are
presumptive criminals and surely have a propensity to be criminals. 14 6
Similar arguments could be made against GLB people's jury service
and marriage: the state ought not enroll as jurors people who openly
143. 80 F.3d 915 (4thCir. 1996) (en banc).
144. Id. at 923-27. Thomasson's result and analysis have been followed in Able v.
United States, 155 F.3d 628, 632 (2d Cir. 1999); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124
F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir. 1997); and Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 261 (8th Cir.
1996).
145. There is an absurdity about this statement, I concede, but in my view the
social stigma against homosexuality remains strongly connected to many people's
tendency to see GLB people only through the lens of sexuality.
146. See, e.g., Department of Defense Directive No. 1332.14.H.l.a and b(1)-(2)
(Dec. 1993) (separation from the armed services justified either by illegal sodomy or a
statement [like "I am a homosexual"] showing a propensity to commit criminal
sodomy).
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announce their repeated criminal law violations, and ought not
sanction marriages that are sure to be consummated with sexual acts
considered criminal in the jurisdiction. Indeed, this could even be a
justification for denying GLB people the right to vote: as presumptive
sodomites, gay voters routinely commit one of the "crimes of moral
turpitude" which have traditionally been a basis for
disenfranchisement in some states.
Commentators reject and even make fun of this kind of argument as
a multifaceted conflation of status and conduct, 47 but such a critique
does not completely understand the argument or its cultural depth.
The state can and often ought to treat a group of citizens as second-
class based upon their criminal conduct: rapists ought to have their
marriage rights restricted, perjurers ought not serve on juries, and
violent criminals ought not serve as soldiers. The Constitution poses
no barrier to these exclusions, because the state can not only regulate
conduct directly, but in the civic republic it ought to deny some rights
to those prone to break the law. Under this line of thinking, the
difference between gay people and racial minorities or women is that
the latter groups are not defined by their illegal conduct. One can
read the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick' " for the
proposition that, because Congress and the states can make
consensual sodomy a serious crime, they can also treat presumptive
sodomites as second-class citizens. Authority to impose a great
penalty suggests authority to impose lesser ones.
Yet the Court at least implicitly rejected this reading of Hardwick in
Romer v. Evans,149 which overturned an anti-gay initiative on equal
protection grounds, because it seemed to deprive gay people of a
broad array of ordinary legal protections. Justice Kennedy's opinion
for the Court started with the proposition that "the Constitution
'neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.""'" A pragmatic
understanding could read Evans to negate the "homosexuals-are-
presumptive criminals" argument as a basis for broad denials of the
obligation-related rights identified in this article (e.g., jury service),
but possibly key to Kennedy's opinion was his concern that the
initiative could have deprived gay people of recourse to the courts.5
The latter point could be a basis for reading Evans narrowly, the
former a basis for a broader reading. Consistent with the broader
147. See Janet E. Halley, Don't: A Reader's Guide to the Military's Anti-Gay
Policy 27-33 & passirn (1999), for the most detailed critique of the distinction.
148. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (rejecting a privacy attack on a law making sodomy
between consenting adults a felony).
149. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
150. Id at 623 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added)).
151. See id. at 627-31 (criticizing even a narrow reading of the initiative as taking
away from gay people "the safeguards," that is, antidiscrimination laws enforced
through courts and agencies, "that others enjoy or may seek without constraint").
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reading, I would interpret Evans' insistence on full gay citizenship as
one further justification for overruling or abrogating Hardwick.152
Viewing the matter through the lens of obligation, I agree with Justice
Scalia's dissenting view (through the lens of rights) that Evans and
Hardwick cannot be reconciled, 153 but of course the civic obligation
principle insists that it must be Hardwick and not Evans that bites the
constitutional dust. I should add this obvious but still resistible point:
there is no cogent justification for disrespecting lesbians and gay men
for consensual intimacy-and the few laws still deeming this a serious
felony154 are more serious as infringements on citizenship than as
infringements on privacy.1 55
2. Don't Ask, Don't Tell and the Closet
The "homosexuals-as-presumptive-criminals" argument has
receded (but by no means disappeared) in American public discourse;
many moderates who consider such an argument bigoted or old-
fashioned are receptive to another argument against full citizenship
for GLB people. This argument exploits the fact that sexual
orientation, unlike race and sex, is perceived to be invisible: you
cannot identify a lesbian as such unless she self-identifies. The
argument is that a reasonable obligation of citizenship is that people
not "flaunt" themselves in ways upsetting to other citizens and their
children; being openly gay in jury, military, and marital settings is
flaunting of one's sexuality; therefore, the state can follow strategies
that encourage gay people to be discreet, even if the state cannot or
ought not make homosexual conduct illegal. The rule supported by
this argument is that GLB people may vote, serve on juries and in the
armed forces, participate fully in the public school system, or some
combination of these, so long as they are reasonably discreet about
their sexual orientation. What that discretion entails is a local matter;
it may vary across jurisdictions and may change over time.
This civic virtue argument has significant descriptive power. That
judges, lawyers, other jurors, and general cultural norms discourage
152. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylaw: Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet
149-73 (1999) (discussing various reasons, including Evans, for overruling or
narrowing Hardwick) [hereinafter Eskridge, Gaylaw].
153. See Evans, 517 U.S. at 641-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
154. The Code of Military Justice still considers consensual sodomy a felony, as do
the criminal codes of Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Virginia. Other states criminalizing
consensual sodomy make the crime a misdemeanor. For references, see Eskridge,
Gaylaw, supra note 152, at 342-51.
155. Realistically, laws criminalizing sodomy are almost never enforced against
relations between consenting adults (straight as well as gay) and are overwhelmingly
enforced against relations that prosecutors think are nonconsensual. Hence, most of
the "consensual sodomy" prosecutions nowadays are insurance prosecutions in male-
female rape cases.
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gay jurors from announcing their homosexuality is surely the reason
there have been so few jury discrimination cases." GLB people have
routinely voted, even during periods of antigay Kulturkampf, because
the registrars could not possibly sort gay from nongay voters."t
Similarly, countless GLB people have served in the United States
armed forces, and their secret identities have rarely caused problems
for other soldiers and the military command.158 Reflecting actual
practice, the current policy for enforcing the exclusion is a porous one
whose tag line is "don't ask, don't tell": GLB people can serve so long
as they keep their orientations and conduct a secret, which the chain
of command supposedly makes easy by enforcing the rule against
asking soldiers about their sexual orientation.159 Most same-sex
relationships and unions have to be less secret than does a gay
identity in the military, but they are tolerated as long as the
participants are discreet and do not seek a state "stamp of approval"
through marriage licenses."6 And, as always, gay people are free to
marry-people of the "opposite" sex, that is. Marriage to someone of
the opposite sex has been a common way that GLB people have
covered their secret orientations and defended themselves against
state and private inquisitors."'
The don't ask, don't tell line of thinking retains some normative
bite as well. It is presented as a tolerant policy, allowing gay people
their private space while preserving public space for heterosexuality.
It has great appeal to parents, who are fearful that gays in the military,
gay marriages, and lesbian and gay schoolteachers would constitute
powerful state signals to their own children, wavering on the sexual
precipice, always in danger of falling into the abyss of homosexuality
or worse. Don't ask, don't tell offers homophobic people refuge from
156. Cf. Johnson v. Campbell, 92 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting objection
to an allegedly antigay peremptory challenge on the ground that the sexual
orientation of the juror was not known, and objecting counsel could only point to
"mannerisms" as the basis for his "knowledge").
157. Even in states that made consensual sodomy a crime and disenfranchised
people for violating the sodomy law, few actually lost their votes, because gay people
were almost always arrested for a lesser crime, like solicitation or lewd conduct, and
when they were arrested for sodomy were usually able to plea-bargain to a lesser
offense. See Eskridge, Gaylaw, supra note 152, at 60, 67.
15& See generally Allan Brrub6, Coming Out Under Fire: The History of Gay Men
and Women in World War Two (1990); Randy Shilts, Conduct Unbecoming: Lesbians
& Gays in the U.S. Military, Vietnam to the Persian Gulf (1993).
159. Thus, Thomasson also rejected the argument, forwarded by the Family
Research Council, that the "don't ask, don't tell" enforcement policy was inconsistent
with the statute. Compare Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 919-21, with id. at 935,
942-43 (Luttig, J., concurring).
160. See Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 311 (1992) (the most persuasive
argument against same-sex marriage is pragmatic-people would read it as a "stamp
of approval" for relationships they consider icky).
161. See, eg., Laud Humphreys, Tearoom Trade: Impersonal Sex in Public Places
105 (rev. ed. 1975) (stating that in the olden days, more than half of the men who had
anonymous sex with other men in public restrooms were married).
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the objects of their fears, and sex-negative people refuge from even
more sexualization of public spaces.16 On the other hand, from the
perspective of GLB people and those with empathy for gays, state-
imposed or state-encouraged discretion about their orientation creates
a suffocating closet.163 What equal gay citizenship is all about is the
ability of openly GLB people to marry, serve on juries and in the
military, and so forth. Would people of color be equal citizens in this
country if they were required to hide their race, or be discreet about
it, in order to participate in the armed forces and juries? Would
women be equal citizens if they had to pass for men (which many did)
in order to serve in the military or to vote?
3. Incrementalism
A pragmatic understanding of rights and obligations will, over time,
insist on full citizenship for GLB people, but also cautions against the
liberal's (and the lawyer's) tendency to insist that the state
immediately recognize and implement all legitimate rights. If
citizenship is a web of rights and obligations, and is social as well as
legal, longstanding exclusions will not easily melt away. Those who
are holders of the status-enhancement will not yield it easily; and
many will view the citizenship-recognition of a long-excluded group as
a denigration of their own citizenship. As long as there is continuing
prejudice and stereotyping against the outsider group, many
privileged citizens will be alarmed that the things they find most
repulsive about the outsiders (their imagined conduct) will be
promoted by an egalitarian state policy.
The insight of Baker1 64 is that the state obligation to equalize the
citizenship of unfairly excluded groups is not an obligation that must
be carried out instantly. In tolerant Hawaii, the judicial insistence that
same-sex couples be given marriage licenses resulted in a state
constitutional amendment negating that right.165 In contrast, the
Vermont political process created a new institution, civil unions, that
enable lesbian and gay couples to announce their mutual
commitments and show the doubters that lesbians and gay men are
capable of adult obligations. The normalization of same-sex unions
through an intermediate institution enabled the Netherlands'
parliament to enact a same-sex marriage statute earlier this year. The
162. The latter point in text depends upon the premise that the open homosexual is
perceptively sexualized in more ways than the open heterosexual. For many
Americans, the sight of a man wearing a pink triangle immediately conjures up sexual
images-disgusting images-that the sight of a man wearing a wedding ring does not.
163. The psychological harms of the sexual closet are well-recognized by medical
professionals. See, e.g., Janis S. Bohan, Psychology and Sexual Orientation: Coming to
Terms 94-104 (1996).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 137-41.
165. The story is told in Eskridge, Equality Practice, supra note 131, ch. 1.
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new law enjoyed a degree of wide public support (and acquiescence)
that was not possible in the 1990s before the country had
experimented with registered partnerships. When the earlier law
yielded no disasters and allowed thousands of couples to be joined in
productive unions, public sentiment was more hospitable to same-sex
marriage. The same phenomenon ought to occur in Vermont,
presumably over a much longer period of time, given the more intense
level of public homophobia in the United States.
The incrementalism feature of the pragmatic understanding is the
most legitimate point raised by the Defense Department in its
ambivalent support for the don't ask, don't tell policy. The problem
with don't ask, don't tell is that it legitimizes the closet and is a state
signal that young men's hatred for, or anxiety about, homosexuals is a
valid feeling. Don't ask, don't tell was predicted to be a dumb
experiment, and its operation has largely vindicated the pundits'
skepticism. A better experiment would be for the armed forces to do
for GLB people what it did for people of color near the end of World
War H-identify particular units that would be "integrated" and see
how they work. It is highly likely that battalions operating under
strong directives against excluding or discriminating against GLB
colleagues would encounter very few problems: most of the gay
soldiers would remain closeted, but at least relieved of the possibility
of interrogation about their private thoughts and actions, and in the
units where some would be empowered enough to come out of their
closets, friction with homophobic colleagues could be managed. Over
time, there would probably be some sorting, whereby some units
would have reputations as gay-friendly, attracting not just gay people
into service but an increasing number of genuinely gay-friendly
straight people. I bet that such units would have above-average
performances, not just because lesbians and gay men are excellent
soldiers, but also because the units would bond in a special way to
prove that tolerance can work. Although the Defense Department
itself would have to devise and implement this kind of plan, and
therefore the plan would work best if the initiative came from within
the executive branch, even a pragmatic approach has room for gentle
nudges from the judiciary. Thus, the Supreme Court could abrogate
Thomasson without requiring the armed forces to abandon its old
policy overnight. Following the Baker strategy, the Court could
remand the matter to the Defense Department to devise an
appropriate remedy, such as the special units idea."t
166. Recall that it was the President or Congress that abandoned earlier racial and
gender exclusions from military service. This would augur in favor of a judicial push




The conceptual exercise reflected in this article would not be
complete without recognizing that a Lieber-like or nomos-inspired
connection between right and obligation is an idea whose time has
come and gone. Doctrinally, the Supreme Court has for more than a
century given no normative weight to Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and very little to the privileges or immunities clause.
The Court missed its opportunity to explore connections between
right and obligation in The Slaughterhouse Cases, and the Equal
Protection Clause (in particular) has come to occupy whatever
potential constitutional space a meaningful citizenship or privileges
and immunities clause could inhabit. Through a twisted path of
dependence, these provisions have been rendered a kind of
constitutional appendix. But it would require little disturbance of
precedent to read either provision more broadly; the holding of The
Slaughterhouse Cases can easily survive even if the dicta were
trimmed back. Recall, moreover, that the ways in which right and
obligation interconnect to produce citizenship can help explain
puzzles in the Court's application of the equal protection clause.
Because the equal protection clause is so open-ended, it requires a
limiting principle and a guiding purpose. Enforcing rights with special
vigor when they are needed to reaffirm the universal obligations of
citizenship can serve both ends admirably.
A much bigger problem is that the focus on citizenship itself is
becoming obsolete and may not be saved by Justice Brewer's denizen
concept. In the new world order, the civic virtue and pragmatic
advantages of local citizenship are giving way to a transnational
marketplace, where citizenship in a particular country is increasingly
an adventitious formality. Internationalization may press the
industrial world relentlessly toward abstract universal human rights
and an ever-thinning reciprocity understanding of the relationship
between rights and obligations. This possibility strikes me as both real
and speculative. In my equally speculative view, the transnational
forces that push us outward and apart are not the only ones generated
by the post-industrial economy. The same economy impels us to seek
local community and rooted citizenship. Just as federalism and the
virtues of local government could make a comeback in a period of
shrinking distances, so those of civic obligation can gain traction in the
teeth of expanding horizons.
The outward push of transnational livelihood is related to the
deepest problem for the venture I endorse: Does our culture have
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enough social capital to make it workable? 67 It is surely true that
citizens do not take jury duty, military service, voting, marriage, or
contractual promises as seriously as they did a generation ago. And it
is doubtful that the Supreme Court's announcement of a thicker
connection between right and obligation will reverse this ongoing
trend. Like other academic theories, my links between rights and
obligations may be merely aspirational, but I remain confident that
institutions like marriage and voting will retain at least some of their
cultural power. In any event, these are aspirations we must have as a
polity, for otherwise we shall wither. Thus, the decline of old forms of
cooperation and community must be counterbalanced by the rise of
new ones-the internet, professional activities, social movement
engagements, and so forth. It may be that jury duty and military
service will continue to erode as bridging institutions that bring people
together-but that trend makes it even more important that the
country develop other kinds of bridging institutions. These new
institutions, such as new forms of family recognition and of dispute
resolution, will be the new frontier for constitutional jurisprudence.
167. See generally Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse of American
Community (2000) (arguing that many indicia suggest a steady decline after 1960 in
American "social capital," that is, willingness to trust and cooperate with one's
neighbors).
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